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The road between law and economics has long been a one-way
street. While lawyers have looked to economic theory for help in
thinking about legal issues, economists have rarely found the law a
fruitful source of ideas. As a result of this imbalance, economics has
acquired a mystique for many lawyers, who relate to economists with
the same deference that economists accord the physicists and mathema-
ticians from whom they are said to get most of their ideas.
Selling the People's Cadillac' is a lawyer's attempt to put economics
in its place. Its premises are that economists have failed to develop a
useful framework of ideas for thinking about the large industrial
corporation and that we must look to law and the humanities for fresh
insights into the proper role of big business. These assumptions lead
Professor Deutsch to thinkers who are not often cited in seminars on
the industrial corporation. Samuel Beckett, Robert Dahl, L.T. Hob-
house, and Herbert Marcuse all appear at one time or another in this
book, as Deutsch seeks his own somewhat eccentric path to an under-
standing of the large corporation. Deutsch does not cut a trail for those
who would follow him in this quest. His ideas emerge through a
collection of reprinted materials, some written by Deutsch and some
by others-magazine pieces, book reviews, law journal articles, and a
few unpublished essays-with little editorial commentary. The reader
is forced to find his own way through Deutsch's thoughts, inferring
ideas as much from the juxtaposition of materials as from Deutsch's
few explicit statements. What does seem clear, however, is that Deutsch
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regards law, particularly constitutional law, as the most promising
source of ideas about the large corporation. In Selling the People's
Cadillac the labors of the great 20th-century constitutional theorists
to reconcile the power of the Supreme Court with democratic social
theory become a paradigm for the effort that must be hade to come to
terms with the power of big business.
Deutsch's starting point is the description of the advanced industrial
corporation in John Kenneth Galbraith's The New Industrial State.-
Here we have the familiar portrait of the large corporation as a levi-
athan, seeking growth and security rather than maximum profits, and
overcoming consumer sovereignty through product advertising. The
real power in the organization is shared by legions of scientists, en-
gineers and systems analysts who comprise Galbraith's "technostruc-
ture." Deutsch presents Galbraith's ideas through a filter of book re-
views and critical articles which also expose us to the objections that
have been made to Galbraith's views. Galbraith appears to have two
groups of critics: professional economists, represented by Robert Solow,
who quarrel with his generalization that large corporations, free from
the discipline of market forces, typify our economy; and lay analysts,
represented by Bernard Nossiter and Simon Lazarus, who are put off
by Galbraith's complacency about corporate power and his disdain
for antitrust and other measures to encourage competition. While
Deutsch does not take issue with these lines of criticism, he does not
pursue them either. He appears to believe that there is enough truth
in Galbraith's description of the American economy, and little enough
chance of success for the reforms proposed by Galbraith's lay critics,
that he can assume big business will continue to have great economic
power. The interesting question then becomes what we think about
the way in which corporations use their power. Apparently finding
Galbraith's views inadequate, Deutsch sets out to answer this question
for himself.
His ideas begin to unfold in the second part of the book, which
contains an account, told principally through contemporaneous mag-
azine articles, of the birth of the Edsel. By the time of the Edsel's con-
ception ii_ the mid-1950s, a new management had rescued the Ford
Motor Company from near destruction at the hands of its founder and
had reestablished Ford as the peer of Chevrolet in the low-price auto-
mobile field. But, as one of Ford's vice presidents observed, Ford was
still "growing customers for General Motors." 3 Ford owners who
2. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d rev. ed. 1971).
3. P. 34.
186
Vol. 86: 185, 1976
Greening the Grey Flannel Suit
graduated into the middle-price range found the lone Mercury
matched against three General Motors brands and an equal number
at Chrysler (remember the illustrious DeSoto?).
The Edsel was intended to fill out the Ford line, enabling Ford to
confront General Motors across the medium-price field. To achieve
this goal, Ford created a car that reflected the years in which it was
designed, the belle epoque of tail fins and two-tone hardtops. But the
timing of the Edsel designers was wrong. When the Edsel came to
market in late 1957, a recession had begun, the Sputnik had in-
augurated a national mood of self-criticism, and the Edsel quickly
became a symbol of the garish consumerism that was temporarily in
disfavor. By 1960 the Edsel was dead.
Deutsch emphasizes the role of Robert McNamara in the Edsel
story. McNamara had come to Ford after World War II with a team
of management "Whiz Kids" from the Air Force Office of Statistical
Control. By 1954 he was Assistant General Manager of the Ford Divi-
sion, not a key figure in the Edsel decision, but important enough to
attend all the meetings. McNamara's austere vision of the American
automobile was revealed a few years later in the stripped-down Ford
Falcon. He would appear to have been the natural enemy of the
tawdry Edsel; and at one meeting he did express what must have been
strong latent reservations about the Edsel, arguing against agreeing
upon the specifications for the car and asking what the new car was
"intended to offer the car-buying public."4 But for the most part
McNamara remained in the background while the Edsel decision was
made. Deutsch's materials suggest two reasons for McNamara's ret-
icence. His faith in systematic and quantitative methods seems to
have made it difficult for him to oppose an organizational decision
based on market studies and motivation research. Furthermore, there
was such a strong moral component to his reservations about the new
car that he may have found it difficult to express his misgivings in
terms that would count as a good argument at a meeting of Ford
executives. Looking back at the Edsel section from the later parts of
Selling the People's Cadillac, one catches a glimpse of McNamara as
the ideal Deutschian businessman, someone with a healthy sense of
values and intuitive faculties; but one also sees that McNamara was
obliged to set these qualities aside, first as a Ford executive and later as
Secretary of Defense.
Deutsch's next step is to give general expression to the ideas he has
4. P. 72.
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intimated in his materials on McNamara and the Edsel. Readers who
are ill at ease with Deutsch's indirect, casebook style of exposition may
find Deutsch elliptical at this point, for he expresses his ideas about
the large corporation through his own 92-page law review article about
constitutional adjudication. Deutsch appears to have included the law
review article, indeed made it the centerpiece of the book, because of
an analogy between the Supreme Court and the large industrial cor-
poration. Both institutions are anomalies in a society that is supposed
to be based on democratic principles-the Supreme Court because it
overturns legislation enacted by Congress and approved by the Presi-
dent, the large corporation because its managers exercise great eco-
nomic power over people who have had no part in selecting them for
the role. In the past, these anomalous powers have been obscured by
explanations that focused on external constraints, attributing the
decisions of corporate management to impersonal, market-determined
objectives5 and explaining Supreme Court decisions as expressions of
"neutral principles"6 or of the "fixed and certain standards" 7 of the
Constitution. Recently, however, thoughts about big business and the
Supreme Court have moved in different directions. While apologists
of the large corporation have continued their defense of the free market
model, constitutional scholars have acquired a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the Supreme Court.
The hero of this enterprise and of Deutsch's article is Alexander
Bickel, whose celebration of the "passive virtues" showed the Court's
great freedom and flexibility in deciding whether to reach a substan-
tive question that had been presented to it.s Deutsch's only quarrel
with Bickel is that he did not go far enough: once he deemed it ap-
propriate for the Court to act, Bickel became as squeamish as the next
Harvard lawyer about unprincipled decisions.9 Deutsch, by contrast,
would allow the Court the same freedom of action on matters of
substance that Bickel said was appropriate for procedural questions.
While some of Deutsch's arguments are variations on the prudential
themes of The Least Dangerous Branch, ° his basic point is that the
law cannot realistically aspire to Justice Black's "fixed and certain
5. E.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965); Peterson, Corporate Control and Capitalism, 79 Q.J. ECON. 1, 9-14 (1965).
6. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HxRv. L. REv.
1, 15-20 (1959).
7. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 691 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
8. A. BicxFL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
9. Pp. 134, 138.
10. A. BicKtEL, supra note 8.
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standards." The interaction between our social values and the facts of
life is too subtle and complex to be captured by reasoning from con-
stitutional first principles or even, on occasion, by any sort of reasoned
opinion. Deutsch's sense of the limits of rational discourse leads him
to the common law as the proper paradigm for constitutional adjudica-
tion. Other constitutional theorists have found the common law, with
its subordination of logic to experience, too unruly a model for con-
stitutional interpretation,11 but to Deutsch the half-articulated opin-
ions of the common law are as close as judges can come to principled
decisionmaking and still retain the flexibility to respond to the bound-
less variety of circumstances judges encounter in the cases that come
before them.
If judges are to be allowed to overrule Congress without even giving
the reasons for their decisions, how are we to be protected from
judicial tyranny? (This, of course, is the question that started con-
stitutional lawyers in their search for "neutral principles" and "fixed
and certain standards.") Deutsch's answer seems to be that our shared
idea of how a judge should behave is our protection against arbitrary
political decisions. When someone who has spent a lifetime as a lawyer
in our society puts on the black robes, he tries, with aberrant excep-
tions, to behave like the model Supreme Court Justice, expressing
social ideals rather than his own views in his decisions. The discipline
of written opinions and the aspiration towards logical decisions are
important, even when judges fail to account for their decisions in
terms of general principles of law, for this discipline and this aspira-
tion perform "the function of continually reminding participants in
government of the overriding social values our society seeks to impose
upon the governmental process, of the ideals in terms of which we
desire to be ruled."' 2
The study of the Supreme Court offers an object lesson to those
who worry about corporate power. Corporate executives have no com-
parable tradition of seeking to accommodate their decisions to a broad
range of social values. Indeed, with the encouragement of classical
economic theory, businessmen have generally believed that it is their
job to seek the greatest possible profits for shareholders, subject to
some very broad limits of humane behavior. The weakness Deutsch
finds in this approach to the role of the businessman is that when
market restraints do not work, because competition is imperfect, the
business executive lacks the judge's gyroscope of internalized values to
11. Pp. 98-99.
12.. P. 182.
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take the place of the missing external controls. In offering the Supreme
Court Justice as a role model for the business executive, Deutsch seems
to be saying that we should transcend our old arguments about the ac-
curacy of the free market model and accept the corporate manager as
a powerful figure in our society, but that we should also develop in
corporate managers an internal commitment to look beyond the size,
profits, and stability of the firm.
In a year in which our politics have been dominated by a candidate
of spiritual renewal, there is a special timeliness to a book that seeks
to establish corporate responsibility through an inner transformation
of the business executive. Yet in reading Deutsch's book, I found my-
self uneasy with the thought of diluting the businessman's commit-
ment to profit and productive efficiency. Despite suggestions that
large corporations sometimes seek sales volume, growth, or security,
rather than the largest possible profits, 13 I am convinced that profit
maximization remains supreme as* the value businessmen think they
ought to pursue, in much the same way that judges aspire to principled
decisions. As Deutsch, with his emphasis upon intangible factors, would
recognize, the preeminence of profit maximization among the values
of big business gives an important moral advantage to the adherents
of that value when they struggle with members of management who
represent other points of view-the technology buff, for example, who
would spend the company's money on exotic electronic equipment, or
those who would trade profits for an easier or richer life for manage-
ment. The strict profit maximizers often appear as the villains of
business fiction-one recalls the accountant in Executive Suite14-but
they are villains with a spiritual ascendancy over their opponents, who
cannot articulate an alternative view of where the corporation should
be going.
The ethic of profit maximization obviously accounts for much of
the harshness of American society, but this vice has its corresponding
virtues. The exaltation of the pursuit of profit has given us vigorous
institutions committed to the goal of productive efficiency. One thinks
of Robert McNamara squeezing the last dollar out of the cost of
manufacturing a Ford, so that Ford could use internally generated
funds to finance a capital investment needed to catch up with Chev-
rolet. To appreciate the positive contribution that such attitudes make
to our society we need only consider institutions, such as the U.S.
13. E.g., W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52 (rev. ed. 1967);
R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIc THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM 46-132 (1964).
14. C. HAWLEY, EXECUTIVE SUITE (1952).
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Army, or cultures, such as that of Great Britain, in which efficiency is
a moribund value.
Deutsch might reply that he does not propose to eliminate the com-
mitment to efficiency in American industry, but only to balance the
pursuit of profit with other values. As a good institutionalist, however,
he would recognize that the spirit of a social institution may not
survive repeated attacks or reform measures. Who can say what would
happen to the American businessman's commitment to productive
efficiency if he were to become more sensitive to the psychological
toll of life on an assembly line or to the landscape of an industrial
suburb? A devotion to getting the job done may require a certain
narrowness of vision that is incompatible with the consciousness raising
Deutsch has in mind for the corporate executive.
These considerations suggest that a revolution in the values of big
business should be avoided if there are other ways in which the be-
havior of business can be made to comply with the will of society. In
considering the availability of such alternatives, one comes upon a
crucial difference between the large corporation and the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court is truly a sovereign institution. Other units
of government do not review its decisions, nor can they influence its
policies except by means that are cumbersome or indirect.1 Business,
on the other hand, is subject to almost unlimited governmental regula-
tion. Admittedly, the history of governmental regulation of business
is not one of unbroken success. But if we can contemplate the basic
change in the large corporation that Deutsch has in mind as a realistic
alternative, it does not seem farfetched to consider the possibility of
effective external controls over business, particularly if external con-
trols are broadly conceived to include the non-governmental or quasi-
governmental means of external control-such as investigative report-
ing and public interest litigation-that have grown in importance in
the past few years."0 This gives us a fresh vantage point from which to
consider Deutsch's history of the Edsel. Could external controls have
prevented the squandering of men and money on the Edsel, or does
the Edsel symbolize a spiritual corruption of American business that
can only be cured by the inner reform Deutsch proposes?
The most prominent fact about the Edsel is that it was a large,
grandiose automobile that came to market at precisely the time con-
sumer tastes were temporarily shifting to cars that were smaller and
less ostentatious. This remarkable feat of bad timing has made
15. Deutsch himself notes this characteristic of the Court at p. 107.
16. Deutsch discusses several possible legal standards of conduct for corporate man-
agers and judicial imposition of such standards at pp. 231-59.
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the Edsel the symbol of the American automobile industry's attach-
ment to large, overpowered cars. When the industry is blamed for
alienating the millions of people who drive foreign cars or for build-
ing cars whose prodigious consumption of gasoline has given us a
negative balance of trade in oil, the Edsel often comes to mind. Only
an industry devoted to size and power, it would seem, could have been
so obtuse as to introduce a car like the Edsel in 1957. That, of course,
is why the Edsel seems to provide a suitable case study for a book
about the values of American business. But as we read about the Edsel
event, the American automobile industry's supposed attachment to
size and power melts away. Nowhere in the materials Deutsch has
assembled is there evidence that the creators of the Edsel resisted or
turned their back on a growing demand among automobile buyers for
something smaller and simpler.17 Indeed, the car's functional char-
acteristics played a small part in the Edsel story: the people in charge
of the Edsel apparently assumed that all cars were basically the same.
Having selected the basic middle-price chassis and engine of the
mid-1950s, they proceeded to focus on important things like exterior
design and marketing. The only prophetic note in all this was Mc-
Namara's remark about doing something for the car-buying public;
but there is no evidence that his qualms were based on an intimation
that consumers were turning against fancy cars. The real reason the
Edsel was oversized and grotesquely overdressed is that it was designed
at the end of one era of American automobile tastes and was produced
at the beginning of another. At the time it was designed there were
no storm signals to warn of the impending shift to austere tastes.
(Something similar seems to have occurred in 1976 as Chevrolet
brought out the Chevette just when consumers were swinging back
to more spacious cars.) The creators of the Edsel can be faulted for
not anticipating the trend to smaller cars only if we think corporate
management should be a spiritual vanguard, looking ahead and lead-
ing their customers to higher values.
Perhaps the venality of the automobile industry would be clearer if
we looked past the innocent years in which the Edsel was created to
the 1960s and early 1970s when it became evident that many Americans
were swearing off large and powerful cars. A good history of the
American automobile in this period might reveal a pernicious attempt
17. Any conclusions about the origins of the Edsel should be qualified by a reference
to the meager sources available for writing business history. Although the rebirth of Ford
after World War II, the rise of the "Whii Kids," and the Edsel fiasco are, I imagine, as
well-documented as any incidents in the history of a corporation, Deutsch was still forced
to rely to a great extent on contemporaneous news magazine articles in telling of these
events. Such materials obviously give us something other than the inside story.
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to stem the tide of austerity with advertising that glorified speed and
power and quasi-sports cars like the Mustang. Certainly, external
controls did nothing to restrain the influence of the automobile com-
panies in this period; only after the Arab oil boycott of 1973 did
governmental regulation of automobile gasoline consumption begin
to appear on legislative agendas. The failure of government to inter-
fere with the automobile companies, however, does not mean that we
are unable to implement our social values through external controls.
Rather, it may be evidence that at least until the mid-1970s there was
no consensus that the size and power of cars should be regulated.
Through the 1960s most people believed that these were matters of
taste, and even those of us to whom it was a mark of superiority to
take advice from Consumer Reports instead of Road and Track would
have blanched, I believe, at the thought of imposing preferences on
others. The progress made in the 1960s and early 1970s in establishing
safety and environmental controls on automobile design shows the
feasibility of regulating the automobile industry through external
controls, once a consensus on the need for regulation has been reached.
This raises the question of whether corporate responsibility is the real
subject of Deutsch's book. Corporate responsibility implies bringing
the values of the corporation into line with the values of the rest of
society; but the desirability of small, more-efficient, less-ornate cars
was not a view on which the rest of society was united in the period
covered by Deutsch's book. Indeed, it was the exceptional person who
thought that small was better when it came to cars. This may explain
why Deutsch seems to brush aside external controls in his call for an
internal reform of the larger corporation. For what he seems to be
asking of corporate management is not merely conformity to the
values of the rest of society, but leadership in the development of new
values remote from the values with which big business is generally
associated.
Because Deutsch's ideas seem to go beyond corporate responsibility,
they are not easily reconciled with the prevailing view of the legal
obligations of management to the shareholders of the corporation.
Deutsch appears to believe that we can preserve sufficient leeway for
corporate managements to do good by defining a proper corporate
purpose to include not only maximizing profits, but also furthering
broad social aims in which the corporation has a stake. There is some
authority for this view in the corporate charitable contribution case
that Deutsch discusses.' s This case, however, involved small sums of
18. Pp. 256-57.
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money and is therefore an uncertain guide to how the courts would
react if management's act of conscience required a substantial sacrifice
by the corporation. Management might be in real difficulty if it forced
the company to suffer great loss in order to exceed the requirements
of applicable law-for example, by eliminating a product on environ-
mental grounds when the environmental protection agencies had
allowed the product to remain on the market, or by halting sales to
an unfriendly country with which Americans were still allowed to
trade. In cases such as these, the courts are likely to believe strongly
that it is not management's job to make social policy with the stock-
holders' money. Depending on the facts, the board of directors' actions
might still be successfully defended on the ground that management
is never required to behave in a way it considers immoral in order to
increase the profits of the corporation. Nevertheless, I think that a
management that wished to eliminate a longstanding, profitable line
of business for reasons of conscience would be well advised to get
shareholder approval before going ahead withi the plan. Short of that,
the most prudent course might be to seek the shelter of the business
judgment rule by finding a business justification for the moral
decision.
It is difficult to avoid an air of unreality in exploring the legal
limitations on managerial acts of conscience, because it seems so im-
plausible that the management of a large corporation would have a
commitment to a social cause strong enough to compromise the profit-
ability, of the corporation. This is also the most obvious, and perhaps
the most telling, objection to Deutsch's ideas about reforming business
from within: corporate managers seem, on the whole, to be such un-
promising subjects for the transformation of values Deutsch has pro-
posed. To find an account of how the greening of big business might
be accomplished, one must turn back to the discussion of Galbraith's
ideas in the first part of the book. Galbraith's hopes rest with the
technostructure, the experts who he believes hold the real power in
large corporations. As working intellectuals, these people do not, in
Galbraith's view, really share the aims of top management, and he
looks forward to the day when, as Bernard Nossiter put it, the tech-
nostructure will "throw off its financial chains to the corporations and
their allied state and modify corporate goals to allow for the things
that make life richer-aesthetic concerns, regard for the environment,
a peaceful rather than a militant foreign policy. 2 0 Behind Galbraith's
19. P. 11.
20. Id.
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vision of a revolution of the clerks is an idea of the fundamental unity
of people who work with their minds; engineers and systems analysts
are viewed as secret sharers in the ideas of humanistic intellectuals. It
has always seemed to me that, on the contrary, the experts in the
technostructure and humanistic intellectuals truly are divided into
two cultures, separated by the former group's suspicion of the radical
and unconventional ideas of the latter. While the spread of the new
consciousness among young people may have brought into the techno-
structure a larger proportion of individuals who are sympathetic to
Galbraith's values, the positive influence of this trend has been offset
by a growing conviction among people in larger corporations that they
are under siege from the anti-business forces in our country. This
attitude has alienated them from many of the ideas that circulate in
the rest of the educated portion of our society and has hardened their
resistance to any changes in corporate goals. These are not the people
who are likely to create a revolution in the values of the American
corporation.
In focusing on what I take to be Deutsch's main theme-the need
to change the values of big business-I have paid little attention to
his secondary and supporting themes, including one that Deutsch
develops to a considerable extent: the danger that a highly organized
society such as ours will exaggerate the reliability of quantitative
analysis and the scientific and systematic modes of thought. In his
materials on Ford, Deutsch makes much of the role of motivation
research in the Edsel fiasco and of the way in which McNamara's
judgment was impaired by his exclusive devotion to quantitative
analysis. These ideas are given more general significance by materials
later in the book on the incommunicable nature of truth.21
Of course, the relationship between systematic analysis and the
values Deutsch seeks to cultivate is not a simple one. If Galbraith's
technostructure is to be the agent of change within the corporation, it
would seem essential that systematic methods of analysis continue to
flourish, for it is these methods that provide the technocrats with
their jobs and whatever influence they carry. Moreover, the back alleys
of the corporation that are still free from systematic methods are often
the places where the corporation's worst values flourish. This side of
the systematic control issue can be seen in the past year's stories of
improper payments: the vehicles for bribes and illegal campaign con-
tributions were often special funds that were free from normal ac-
counting procedures, and the remedies developed for these practices
21. P. 218.
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have tended to involve, an increase in the amount of systematic re-
porting and auditing that goes on in the corporation.
These considerations should not deter us from a reexamination of
the role of rational analysis in the corporation if rational analysis has
become a kind of demigod, exalted to an undeserved importance in
business decisionmaking. It is my impression, however, that business-
men generally have a healthy skepticism about these techniques. Even
in the managerial, nonentrepreneurial sector of the economy from
which McNamara emerged, one of the most honored qualities at the
highest levels of business is "good judgment," a compound of the
intuitive faculties Deutsch would restore to prime importance. In this
connection, one should not forget the history of the Ford Motor Com-
pany in which the interregnum of McNamara, the Great Puritan, was
followed by a Restoration under Lee Iacocca, a former salesman whom
no one has ever accused of being a thrall of quantitative methods.
The McNamara-Iacocca polarity nicely symbolizes the issues posed
by Deutsch's book. If mini-McNamaras abound in corporate America,
there is indeed a reservoir of conscience in big business waiting to be
tapped. If Lee Iacoccas are the norm, however, then business is ir-
revocably committed to massive consumption and maximum profits;
and the way to promote other values in our society is through govern-
mental regulation, consumer education, and appeals to public opinion.
Deutsch has written a book with McNamara at its center; but when I
look around me, I see more Iacoccas.
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A Uniform System of Citation. By Columbia Law Review, Harvard
Law Review, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Yale Law
Journal. Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Law Review Association,
12th ed. 1976. Pp. ix, 190. $1.50 (paperbound).
Reviewed by W. Duane Bentont
The long-awaited Twelfth Edition of A Uniform System of Citation
(Twelve)1 has appeared, rendering obsolete at a stroke the Eleventh
Edition of A Uniform System of Citation (Eleven).2 Like the Com-
mentaries of Julius Caesar, Twelve commences with the observation
that its subject matter "is divided into three parts."3 In other respects
the two volumes are unlikely to be confused, although Twelve's oc-
casional nostalgic references to the torching of homes and the pillaging
of towns4 evoke something of the flavor of the old Imperial campaigns.
Torching and pillaging are not, however, within the express com-
petence of this latest in an endless line of guides to legal citation.
Rather, Twelve joins Amy Vanderbilt, the Rules of Baseball, and
totalitarian regimes throughout history in a modest quest to impose
uniformity on more mundane spheres of human activity. Almost all
the 150-odd legal periodicals display a devout solicitude for the rules
of citation, relegating one or more luckless editors to a slavish scrutiny
of all copy for potential violations5 Most opinions, briefs, and
memoranda likewise strive for at least substantial compliance. Without
Twelve, uncounted first year law students and Supreme Court Justices
would have to forego the pages of Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juris-
lenvereins, for want of authoritative permission to footnote it as a man-
ageable "ZBJV." 6
t Member, Missouri Bar.
1. A UNIFORM SYSTEMT OF CITATION (12th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited without cross-
reference as TWELFTH EDITION].
2. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (11th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited without cross-
reference as ELEVENTH EDITION].
3. J. CAESAR, COMMENTARIES 17 (S. De Chair ed. 1951); TWELFTH EDITION ii.
4. TWELFTH EDITION 24.
5. Cf. A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELGO (1974) (any parenthetical commentary
would be superfluous).
6. See TWELFTH EDITION 170.
There are other, less-used systems of citation, each of which recommends generally, and
acknowledges that it basically follows, the Uniform System; but none so much as men-
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Twelve's existence cannot, however, be justified solely by such
considerations. For its ascendancy has been achieved at the expense of
what many had considered a perfectly adequate Eleven. Praised by one
commentator as "the Kama Sutra of legal citation,"7 Eleven will be
mourned by all who prefer white paperback covers to blue. Yet the
rest of mankind will rejoice because the new arrival provides a num-
ber of palpably beneficent innovations.
Life under Eleven was nasty, brutish, and interminable. Its tedious
pages included a draconian code of typeface strictures which required,
inter alia, rendering all book titles and authors in large and small
capital letters.8 Only those with access to sophisticated printing para-
phernalia could hope to achieve this feat; the remainder of the pro-
fession was relegated to the ignominy of civil disobedience whenever
it wished to show that it had read a book. Twelve's first official act is
a declaration that large and small capitals are optional, 9 opening the
way for still more courageous future reformers who will root out once
and for all an aberration that increases the cost of preparing copy
without augmenting the information transmitted.
Not all of Twelve's revisionist fervor is exhausted on questions of
typeface. One list of basic citation forms for all varieties of sources is
introduced, enabling most readers to obtain in two pages the ac-
cumulated wisdom of Eleven's 99.10 And the addition of a host of
minor but useful technical innovations" in Twelve's Part I more than
tions Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins. See M. PRICE & H. BITNER, EFFECTIVE
LEGAL RESEARCH 395-96 (3d ed. 1969); F. WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS
224 (1967); U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, LEGAL REsEARcH GUIDE 7-1 (A.F. Man. 110-1,
1970) (used in all military branches).
7. Lushing, Book Review, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 599 (1967).
8. ELEVENTH EDITION 97-98.
9. TWELFTH EDITION 1.
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. The explanation of quotations is much better than Eleven's. Compare id. at 20-22
with ELEVENTH EDITION 93-94. Twelve describes more fully the use of "supra" and '*here-
inafter" for authorities repeated throughout a piece. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 18-19
with ELEVENTH EDITION 83-84. Unlike the old book, the new one requires that the in-
troductory signal "cf." "not be used without an explanatory parenthetical." Compare
TWELFTH EDITION 7 with ELEVENTH EDITION 87. This requirement should curtail the use
of "cf." to introduce various and sundry irrelevancies, such as the most recent Supreme
Court case or other articles by the footnoting author.
Where Eleven cryptically mentioned the forms for authority related to, and com-
mentary on, sources, Twelve is forthright. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 11-12 with
ELEVENTH EDITION 90. Banning "et seq." after an opening section or paragraph and
requiring inclusive numbers also makes sense, because this Latin phrase sometimes means
"one more," other times "one hundred more." See TWELFTH EDITION 16.
Anyone who has struggled with foreign language abbreviations will welcome Twelve's
new section on foreign language abbreviations. Id. at 23-24. Also needed was the rule on
use and spacing of symbols (§, , S & /X). See id. at 24-25.
Twelve authorizes abbreviation of the Uniform Commercial Code to "U.C.C.," which is
one's natural instinct; Eleven indifferently required "UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE." Corn-
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counterbalances periodic lapses in style12 and a failure to say anything
even faintly disapproving about the addiction to footnotes which man-
gles all legal writing.'3
Flushed with these initial successes, Twelve commits an impetuous
blunder of major dimensions by introducing a new and improved list
of periodical abbreviations.' 4 Twelve could have amplified Eleven by
listing all periodicals in full and appending the recommended abridg-
ments, but that would have been the easy and popular route. Instead,
Twelve tries to economize by providing an alphabetized compendium
of all the individual words one might expect to find in a law journal
title; the reader is invited to assemble particular citations by excavat-
ing each component from different places on the list. The enterprise
is fraught with pitfalls, given several omissions and distortions, 1 and
Pare TWELFTH EDITION 59 with ELEVENTH EDITION 29. Similarly, Twelve shortens the In-
ternal Revenue Code to "I.R.C.," again the common practice; Eleven demanded "INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954." Compare TwELFTH EDITION 59 with ELEVENTH EDITION 27. In contrast
to Eleven's silence, Twelve wisely requires that federal bills and resolutions be cited to
some source, because few libraries keep this incessant flood of papers for more than a
few years. Compare TwELFTH EDITION 62 with ELEVENTH EDITION 32.
12. Twelve suffers from "adverbitis"; "simply," "merely," and "slightly" speckle the
pages. E.g., TWELFTH EDITION 1, 2, 5, 6, 53, 58, 87. At times the authors cannot resist
telling the obvious: "A term of court currently in progress may be referred to as 'this
term.' The immediately preceding term, no longer in progress at time of publication,
should be referred to as 'last term.'" Id. at 28. Nor can they avoid occasional lapses into
murky prose caused by excessive cross-references to their own rules. Eg., id. at 3 (rule
1:2:2). Overall, though, the authors have upgraded Eleven's prose by dropping many
pompous passive phrases, such as "should be cited."
13. As an authoritative guide, Twelve should have said: "Keep footnotes to a
minimum, especially those in the middle of the sentence. They interrupt readers' thoughts
and bother their eyes." Even without this statement, Twelve and Eleven should not, as
they do, encourage footnotes in general and mid-sentence ones in particular. See TWELFTH
EDITION 6; ELEVENTH EDITION 88-89. Twelve itself has no footnotes. Books discussing legal
writing often do not even mention them. E.g., E. BISKIND, LEGAL WRITING SIMPLIFIED (1971).
See generally Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA%. L. REV. 38, 40-41 (1936) (attacks
footnoting; whole article is powerful antidote for those who think about legal writing
only in terms of the rules of citation); Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews-Revisited, 48
Vt. L. REv. 279, 289 (1962); Tobin, Book Review, 11 STAN. L. REV. 410, 411-13 (1959)
(documents over-footnoting but concludes that a moderate number are necessary).
In the same vein, Twelve should dictate: "Unless your piece is especially long (e.g.,
over 40 law review pages), do not cross-reference from one part to another part. Excessive
cross-referencing usually indicates poor organization." Instead, paralleling Eleven, it goes
to the other extreme and gives examples including a "cf." (without an explanatory
parenthetical) to one's own work. TWELFTH EDITION ,18; ELEVENTH EDITION 84. The
comment "passin" should likewise not be recommended; if "a point is repeated through-
out the entire source," simply cite it. See TWELFTH EDITION 15; ELEVENTH EDITION 85.
14. TWELFTH EDITION 89-93.-
15. A series of questions bares these problems and shows the chaos this list will create:
(1) The Academy of Political Science Proceedings was the first example in Eleven's
periodical list. ELEVENTH EDITION 45. Because "political" is not on Twelve's all-inclusive
guide, what is the citation form now? (The same difficulty holds for "cosmetic" in
Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal. See id.) (2) The Texas Law Review abbreviates itself
"TExs L. REV."; Eleven sanctioned this practice. See id. at 47. In light of Twelve's rule
that geographical names must follow its inside back cover, how is it now cited? (3) Many
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could so easily have been averted that one refrains with difficulty from
impugning the motives of those responsible.
Twelve is also remiss in neglecting to rehabilitate certain of Eleven's
most obvious failings. Congressional hearings will still be cited in-
consistently and abominably.' 6 Authors will continue to be deterred
from mentioning state cases, by virtue of the tiresome necessity of
referencing them to the various obscure local reporters T which few
can obtain and even fewer use, given the ubiquitous West sets. Re-
deeming Twelve somewhat, however, are improved treatments of
statutes,' 8 treaties, 19 United Nations sources, 20 and topical reporters.
2 1
Twelve's most significant triumph over Eleven is reserved for Part
times a periodical is called colloquially both "Journal of the X" and "X Journal." Eleven
made abbreviation possible without a check back to the source, by providing specific
examples. See id. at 45-47. Does Twelve require checking the title page of each such
periodical referenced, if the initial research was not especially diligent?
I could continue. I do not suggest that these shortcomings are intractable. They do
demonstrate that nothing substitutes for a periodical-by-periodical list, similar to that in
the Tenth Edition. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 47-53 (10th ed. 1958). Worries about
omitting a publication would fall before careful cross-checking of present lists; new
magazines could be assimilated just as easily to a periodical-by-periodical list as to
Twelve's apostasy.
16. Compare TWELFTH. EDITION 62 with ELEVENTH EDITION 41-42. Eleven and Twel~e
identify hearings by "the bill number . . . with which the hearings are concerned," but
since they often concern several bills, none of which ever becomes law, this is frequently
uninformative. The authors tried to combat this problem by adding: "[A]lways retain the
first word of the title as it appears on the cover page." TWELFrH EDITION 62. (Their ex-
ample is better than their reasoning.) Twelve should have said: "Always retain at least
the first phrase of the title as it appears at the top of the cover page and retain the
whole title if practicable." This would meet the authors' concern over never-ending titles
and permit the reader to find the source, something the present rule may make difficult.
Other citation systems require this title. See M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 6, at 374;
F. WEINER, supra note 6, at 239. In addition, since all depository libraries catalogue
hearings and reports by "serial set" number, including such information in the citation
would save endless time.
17. TWELFTH EDITION 37; ELEVENTH EDITION 6. Price and Bitner feebly argue that dual
citation provides a "check," since one of the two citations is more likely to be correct than
one by itself. M. PRICE & H. BITNER, supra note 6, at 371. This proposition rests on two
dubious assumptions: that the reader can find both sources and that the author would
not be especially careful in citing a sole source (in the spare time made available by not
having to search for the dual source). Even a change in the next edition, however, might
not save brief writers from those courts which still require dual citation. See F. WEINER,
supra note 6, at 234.
18. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 50-61 with ELEVENTH EDITION 25-32. A review of Eleven
labeled its section on statutes "tortuous." See Lushing, supra note 7, at 600-01. Of all the
changes in the transplanted part of Eleven, the clarity and depth of the essay on statutes
is striking.
19. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 67-70 with ELEVENTH EDITION 33, 66-67, 82. To illustrate:
by Eleven's rule, a correct citation would be "Treaty with Iraq on Commerce and
Navigation, Dec. 3, 1938, art. III, para. 2, 54 Stat. 1790 (1939), T.S. No. 960"; by Twelve's
rule, "Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 3, 1938, United States-Iraq, art. III,
para. 2, 54 Stat. 1790 (1939), T.S. No. 960." Eleven's version confused many internationally-
oriented readers.
20. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 73-77 with ELEVENTH EDITION 79-81.
21. Compare TWELFTH EDITION 94-99 with ELEVENTH EDITION 52-54. The expanded list
of examples is of inestimable benefit.
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III, a deliciously rational arrangement of individualized rules for citing
the statutes and cases of the innumerable states and countries that dot
this planet.2-" Eleven virtually abdicated this responsibility, remitting
the reader to the distasteful requirement of purchasing a separate sup-
plement from the Harvard Law Review Association. 23
Twelve is certain to be widely and painstakingly read. But therein
lurks a peril that deserves attention, because an audience dispropor-
tionately composed of impressionable young minds and fading old
ones will prove especially vulnerable to the dubious ideological pre-
dilections which Twelve's editors insert at every opportunity.
The parade of insidious horribles begins on the very last page, in a
diabolically warped "list of suggested abbreviations for states, Canadian
provinces, and foreign countries" whose offensive omissions will out-
rage billions around the world.24 Subliminal manipulation does not
cease here; Twelve's selection of illustrative material for its demon-
stration of proper quotation form is hardly random:
In case of the removal of the President ... P the Vice President
shall become President .... The Senate shall have the sole power
to try all Impeachments.2 5
Twelve's predecessor had the grace to avoid reference to this and com-
parable national nightmares in its treatment of the same subject:
So he... was ordered hanged.
A man died.26
22. See TWELFTH EDITION 100-70. The next edition should consider a change both in
this list and that on the inside back cover. Both abbreviate the states in the traditional
way. However, the Postal Service's two-letter abbreviations are short and unambiguous.
See U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE STYLE MANUAL 150-51 (rev. ed. 1973).
23. ELEVENTH EDITION ii. Even when armed with the supplement, Eleven's owners
lacked a list of general forms for state cases, federal cases and statutes, and foreign
decisions and laws. Hence the added length which this collection causes Twelve is an
illusion not to be worried over, especially in light of Twelve's thorough index.
24. Twelve's compendium is virtually identical to Eleven's, despite the passage of 10
years and the intervening emergence of dozens of infant but proud sovereignties. The sole
additions are Y.T. (p), P.E.I. (?), and Guam (1); inexplicitly omitted is Lab. Both Chinas
are studiously ignored, in a display of diplomatic pusillanimity which would do credit
to Prime Minister Trudeau (all of whose dominions are included, with the exception of
Lab.). Also consigned to oblivion is the Middle East, with the ominous exception of
Egypt (which should be abridged "U.A.R."). India is nowhere to be seen, unless her teem-
ing millions are to be considered merged with the relative handful of Midwesterners who
answer to the pseudonym "Ind." Latin America is more kindly treated, although the
editors have chosen for reasons best known to themselves and the State Department to
disregard the existence of Chile. Finally, in a commendable but unrealistic gesture toward
pan-African solidarity, the assembled sovereignties of the Dark Continent are directed to
refer to themselves as "Afr."
25. TWELFTH EDITION 21.
26. ELEVENTH EDITION 94.
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Then there is the matter of personal titles. Eleven stereotyped all
past and future Justices as "Mr. Justice. ' 27 Twelve, in an excess of
counterrevolutionary zeal, broaches the possibility of a "Mme. Justice,"
only to ruin the gesture with the snide observation that "'Mme.' is
properly used whether the Justice is married or unmarried. ' 28
All this is regrettable, but we must not forget that "the right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society."2 9 Purchasing Twelve, therefore,
subsidizes constitutional values as well as the authors,30 and memoriz-
ing it passes the time until the eagerly awaited publication of the
Thirteenth Edition of A Uniform System of Citation (Thirteen).
27. Id.
28. TWEt.Lmh EDITION 27.
29. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
30. The matter of subsidy has occasioned spirited interchange among Twelve's
creators-the editors of the Harvard, Columbia, and Pennsylvania Law Reviews and the
Yale Law Journal. The latter three felt that Harvard was illegally keeping all profits
from the first eleven editions, estimated to total $20,000 per year. See Crock, Blue Book
Turns Crimson Green, Colum. L. Sch. News, Oct. 28, 1974, at 1, col. I. However, the
discontented trio had lost the correspondence indicating an agreement to split the profits.
Their threats to sue brought a peaceful settlement, in the form of a contract which
provides Harvard with only twice the profits of each of the other schools in return for
continued production and distribution services. See Agreement Between the Columbia,
Harvard, and University of Pennsylvania Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal (Mar.
24, 1976) (on file (it is to be hoped) with the respective periodicals).
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